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Abstract: the aim of this paper is to provide an overview of recent 
research on the connection between patent systems and inventive 
activities in the early phases of industrialization. Perhaps surprisingly, no 
consensus has been reached yet as to whether the emergence of modern 
patent systems exerted a favourable impact on inventive activities. 
however, the recent literature has shed light on a number of important 
features concerning the functioning of patent systems and the nature of 
innovation processes in this period. the concluding section of the paper 
flags some promising directions for further research. 
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1. Introduction
the industrial revolution represented a fundamental 
turning point in human history. Before it, economic 
growth was sluggish and sporadic, so that stagnation in 
living standards was one of the defining characteristics 
of economic life. the industrial revolution marked the 
beginning of a new historical phase characterized by 
sustained economic growth: the origins of the contemporary 
world economy are found in the changes it introduced. 
today, economists and economic historians agree that 
technological change was the fundamental driver of this 
critical watershed. hence, it is clear that a satisfactory 
account of the industrial revolution must explain the 
acceleration of technological change that occurred in 
Britain over the period 1700-1850. not surprisingly, in this 
endeavour particular attention has been devoted to the role 
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of institutions supporting inventive activities and innovation, 
especially the patent system.
the connection between the creation of “modern” patent 
systems and the acceleration of innovation of the industrial 
revolution is explicitly hinted at in one of the most popular 
textbooks on economic growth
it is the presence of patents and copyrights that enables 
inventors to earn profits to cover the initial costs of developing 
new ideas... in the last century (or two), the world economy has 
witnessed sustained, rapid growth, in population, technology 
and per capita income never before seen in history. consider 
now how the... economy would behave in absence of property 
rights. in this case, innovators would be unable to earn the 
profits that encourage them to undertake research in the first 
place, so that no research would take place. With no research, 
no new ideas would be created, technology would be constant, 
and there would be no per capita growth in the economy... 
Broadly speaking, a lack of property rights... prevailed prior to 
the industrial Revolution (Jones and vollrath, 2013, p. 136).1 
this is indeed a simple, compelling and clear-cut 
argument, at least prima facie. interestingly enough, at a 
closer look, the issues become much more complicated. 
in fact, the importance of patents for the British industrial 
revolution and, more in general, for the industrialisation 
of the western world remains a controversial issue among 
historians. Even if a consensus view has not yet emerged, 
the theme has benefited from intensive research over the 
last thirty years. the aim of this paper is to survey this 
stream of research. in particular, we will focus on the British 
experience. the choice of Britain is motivated by the fact 
that it is of obvious interest to consider the role that the 
patent system played in the “making” of the “first industrial 
nation”. however, we shall examine the relationship 
between patents and innovation in the us context as well, 
since this country is regarded by many as the first to adopt 
what may be considered a genuinely modern and effective 
patent system. as we shall see, in both cases, the historical 
record does not lend itself to straightforward and clear-cut 
interpretations. however, on the basis of the studies carried 
out over the last thirty years, it is possible to work out some 
1 see also Jones and vollrath (2013, pp. 87-90). for an influential devastating 
criticism of this notion, see Boldrin and levine (2008).
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cautionary notes concerning the notion that the creation 
of patent systems was the fundamental institutional pre-
requisite triggering the first industrial revolution. 
2. The English Patent System and the Industrial Revolution
We maintain that the debate on the English patent 
system and the industrial revolution may be usefully 
characterized in terms of two opposing views: “optimists” 
vs. “pessimists”.2 the “optimist” view, in its most clear-
cut articulation, is simply an application of the standard 
economic argument for patents that we have sketched above 
to the case of the industrial Revolution. in this perspective, 
the development of a functioning patent system indeed 
represents an essential precondition for the industrial 
Revolution. the “pessimist” view instead contends that 
the incentive effect provided by the patent system was 
limited. furthermore, patents, in several instances, may have 
even played a detrimental role since “blocking patents” 
obstructed inventive activities in several technological fields. 
Rather surprisingly, the role of the patent system in the 
early phases of English industrialization did not become 
a subject of systematic historical investigation until the 
mid 1980s. Before that, the theme had been frequently 
touched upon in most of the works of synthesis providing 
general appraisals of the origins and nature of the industrial 
Revolution. however, these judgments were based on the 
evaluation of the anecdotal experience of a handful of great 
inventors, such as Watt, arkwright, and crompton. against 
this background, it should not come as a surprise that 
assessments of the patent system could be very different. 
let us just consider two of the most authoritative works 
of synthesis on industrialization. north and thomas (1973) 
gave the emergence and the progressive operationalization 
of the patent system a prominent place in their explanation 
of the rise of Britain as the “first industrial nation”:3 
innovation will be encouraged by modifying the institutional 
environment, so that the private rate of return approaches 
2 the terms are, of course, reminiscent of the two clashing camps in the 
industrial revolution “standard of living” debate. 
3 see also north (1981, pp. 164-166). 
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the social rate of return. Prizes and awards provide incentives 
for specific inventions, but do not provide a legal basis for 
ownership of intellectual property. the development of patent 
laws provides such protection... [B]y 1700... England had 
begun to protect private property in knowledge with its patent 
law. the stage was now set for the industrial revolution (north 
and thomas, 1973, pp. 155-156). 
on the other hand, david landes remarked that, 
a number of writers have laid stress on the incentive effect 
of patent legislation. i am inclined to doubt its significance 
(landes, 1969, p. 64).4
against this backdrop, the first contribution to consider 
in a systematic way the connection between the patent 
system and inventive activities during the British industrial 
revolution was dutton’s (1984). the available evidence, 
according to dutton, suggests that the British patent system, 
although requiring the completion of cumbersome and 
expensive bureaucratic procedures5 and granting a rather 
imperfect protection against infringements, was nevertheless 
capable of stimulating inventors’ efforts. his judgment is 
essentially based on a wide-ranging examination of the 
contemporary literature on inventions, which seems to 
indicate that the prospect of the economic exploitation 
of a patent was explicitly considered by several inventors. 
furthermore, dutton also notices the existence of a group 
of “quasi professional inventors”, that is individuals with 
several patents using sale or licensing as the chief approach 
for their economic exploitation. this group of quasi-
4 ashton (1948a, p. 10) was also sceptical of a causal relationship between 
patents and industrialization: “it is at least possible that even without the patent 
system, discovery might have developed just as rapidly as it did”.
 in another “classic” reference work on British industrialization, mathias 
(1969, p. 34) noted that the impact of patent laws on innovation “have proved 
particularly intractable to analyze or to assess” and refrained from formulating a 
final balance.
5 to secure a patent for England and Wales cost approximately £ 100; to 
extend it to scotland and ireland, another £ 200-250 (plus more time and effort). 
a patent agent’s services, which the system’s growing complexity (especially the 
specification) made increasingly desirable, added a further £ 40 to £ 100 (dutton, 
1984, pp. 86-96). it was an enormous expense when a skilled worker earned 
about £ 1 to £ 2 per week. charles dickens famously lampooned this bureaucratic 
excrescence in his “Poor man’s tale of a Patent” and Little Dorrit. the poor man 
afforded his patent only through that common victorian literary device of a chance 
inheritance (macleod, 2007, pp. 184-186). 
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professional inventors constituted the backbone of an 
“infant invention industry”. this process was coupled, at 
least from the early nineteenth century, with the emergence 
of an extensive “trade in invention”. this means that 
patent rights became increasingly the object of market 
transactions (selling of patent rights, licensing, creation 
of commercial partnerships geared at the exploitation of 
patents). this expanding market for invention, providing a 
wide range of opportunities for the economic exploitation 
of inventive activities, reinforced the formation of the 
“specialist” invention industry, with positive effects on the 
rate of technical progress. finally, dutton acknowledges 
that, in many instances, the protection provided against 
infringements by the patent system was fragile due to the 
erratic nature of the judicial treatment of patent cases.6 
however, somewhat paradoxically, even this judicial fragility 
of patents had further positive reverberations, by fostering 
the adoption and diffusion of innovations (dutton, 1984, 
p. 204).7 in our judgment, dutton’s view could be perhaps 
classified as that of a “moderate” optimist: dutton is 
clearly not as sanguine as north about the indispensability 
of patents; nevertheless, on balance, his assessment of the 
evidence maintains that patents provided a non-trivial 
stimulus to technical progress. 
sullivan (1989) appears to confirm dutton’s judgment 
by showing the existence of a structural break in 1757 in 
the time series of English patents. according to sullivan, 
this discontinuity (which is neatly consistent with the 
traditional chronology of the British industrial revolution, 
i.e. 1760-1830) reflects an acceleration in the pace of 
invention taking place in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.8 at least in part, this acceleration is accounted 
6 Bottomley’s research (based on the scrutiny of a wide array of legal 
and administrative sources) implies a more certain legal situation for patent 
matters than dutton suggests (Bottomley, 2014; for a discussion of Bottomley’s 
interpretation see nuvolari, 2015 and macleod, 2015).
7 a similar argument and assessment of the English patent system is developed 
by mokyr (2009). 
8 the existence of discontinuity around 1760 was also noted by Bowden (1925, 
pp. 12-14) and ashton (1948b, pp. 118-120). a recent analysis of the nature of 
the co-integration between the time series of patents and those of industrial output 
in various sectors for the period (1780-1851) performed by Greasley and oxley 
(2007) reveals that the causality link runs mostly from the dynamics of industrial 
output in a restricted number of key-sectors (cotton, iron and mining) to the series 
of aggregate patents. in Greasley and oxley’s interpretation, this result suggests 
that the rise of patenting was a consequence and not a cause of the acceleration of 
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for by the progressive development of a body of case law 
related to the protection and enforcement of the rights 
of patentees. for example, the requirement to “specify” 
the invention (normally within two to four months of 
the patent’s enrolment) was introduced gradually during 
the first third of the eighteenth century; from 1734 it 
became standard. although, initially requested, it seems, 
to assist the law officers in discriminating between similar 
inventions, the “specification” was not normally scrutinized 
by any administrative department of government. as a 
result, many specifications remained vague and opaque 
(macleod, 1988, pp. 48-55). increasingly, however, they 
became subjected to a very close examination when a 
prosecution for infringement reached the law courts. this 
process culminated in lord mansfield’s decision in the 
case of Liardet vs. Johnson (1778) which stipulated that 
the specification should be sufficiently full and detailed 
to enable anyone skilled in the art or trade to which the 
invention pertained, to understand and apply it without 
further experiment (macleod, 1988, p. 49). in other 
words, the time-lag between the enactment of the statute 
of monopolies in 1624 (which is commonly regarded as the 
first English patent law) and the acceleration of inventive 
activities is to be explained by the time needed for firmly 
establishing the rights of the patentees within the framework 
of the British legal system (dutton, 1984, pp. 73-75; 
sullivan, 1989, p. 435). 
christine macleod’s evaluation of the British patent 
system in the early phases of the industrialization process 
is much more cautious and pessimistic (macleod, 1988). 
she draws attention to the frequently heterodox use of 
patents, which continued until (at least) the late eighteenth 
century. the most typical cases were the use of patents in 
support of specific government concessions and franchises 
or for advertising/certifying the specific qualities of a 
product. thus, in several industries, and particularly in the 
medical field, patents were often employed as means for 
constructing product reputation. finally we should also 
be aware of “vanity patenting”, when patents were taken 
by amateur, “gentlemen” inventors, who considered their 
industrial output growth. a similar view, positing that the acceleration of industrial 
output led to a growth in the demand of patenting, was originally sketched by 
ashton (1948b). see also macleod (1988, ch. 8). 
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engagement in scientific and technological activities as an 
enjoyable diversion. for these men, the granting of a patent 
was just a means for achieving a general public recognition 
for their inventive efforts, rather than the basis for the 
economic exploitation of a specific invention. furthermore, 
macleod also notices that a large volume of inventive 
activities was undertaken outside the coverage of the patent 
system. Broadly speaking, in the course of the eighteenth 
century the coverage of the patent system remained highly 
restricted both sectorally (limited to the newly emerging 
capital-intensive sectors) and to commercially dynamic 
urban areas (chiefly, london, Birmingham, Bristol and 
manchester); at the same time, particularly innovative and 
technologically sophisticated industries such as machine 
tools, mining and metallurgy, branches of chemicals, etc. 
remained characterized by a persistently low propensity to 
patent (macleod, 1988, ch. 6).
further evidence in support of a “pessimist” view 
is provided by the detrimental impact on the rate of 
innovation of “blocking patents”. Kanefsky (1978) and 
torrens (1982) argue that Watt’s separate condenser 
patent exerted a negative impact on innovation in 
steam engineering.9 vice versa, the rapid diffusion of 
arkwright type of mills, took place after one of Richard 
arkwright’s patents was declared void in court (hewish, 
1987; chapman, 1972, p. 29). in this respect, in the mid 
nineteenth century concerns over the detrimental impact of 
“frivolous” patents (i.e. patents that were chiefly taken to 
harass manufacturers with preposterous demands for royalty 
payments under the threat of prosecution for infringements) 
on inventive activities were so serious, that, in 1851, several 
of the expert witnesses (including i.K. Brunel) called by the 
select committee of the house of lords on the reform of 
patent laws had no hesitation in proposing the complete 
abolition of the patent system in order to avoid the problem 
(house of lords, 1851).10 
9 for a recent, ingenious (but in our view not completely convincing) attempt 
to rehabilitate Watt’s patent, see selgin and turner (2011) 
10 for an account of the patent controversy in victorian Britain, see macleod 
(1996). on the views of Brunel concerning the negative impact of the patent 
system on the rate of innovation, see Buchanan (2002, pp. 177-178) and miller 
(2006). 
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3. Patents and Industrialization in the USA
it must be recognized that the first patent system working 
by what we might consider truly modern procedures was 
not the British, but the american, especially after the Patent 
reform of 1836 (Khan and sokoloff, 2001).11 until the 
reform of 1852, the British patent system was characterized 
by a very restricted accessibility, due mostly to the high 
costs and the cumbersome administrative procedures 
involved in the process (Khan, 2005, p. 31).12 on the other 
hand, in the united states, the patent application process 
was relatively smooth, involving few, straightforward 
administrative procedures. the us patent fee was $ 30. for 
this reason, one could argue that the validity of north and 
thomas’ hypothesis, linking the acceleration in the rate of 
innovation and the emergence of patent institutions, ought 
to be examined primarily in the case of the united states. 
in a number of recent papers, sokoloff, lamoreaux and 
Khan tackled exactly this issue, examining the relationship 
between the patent system and inventive activities in the 
united states during the nineteenth century (see Khan and 
sokoloff, 2001 for a general overview). their contributions 
are based on an extensive quantitative analysis of the 
evidence collected from the patent records.
sokoloff (1988) considers the patterns of patenting in 
the us over the period 1790-1846. over time, patenting 
exhibits a cyclical behaviour around an upward trend 
which mirrors that of the major economic fluctuations. 
Geographically, patenting exhibits the tendency to cluster 
in areas located in the proximity of navigable waterways 
(which provided low cost access to major markets) and in 
11 the patent reform of 1836 officially introduced the procedure of 
examination. it is also worth noting that, until 1836, the US denied patent 
protection to foreign applicants (Khan, 2005, p. 57). thus, although, the us 
patent system did not protect explicitly the “piracy” and “transfer” of foreign 
technologies, in several instances (in particular in the case of textile technologies) 
it was effectively employed for such purposes. this was typically done by patenting 
marginal improvements of European inventions. for a detailed case-study of the 
attempt to transfer arkwright’s water-frame in the us using the coverage of a us 
patent, see Wallace and Jeremy (1977). 
12 the sensitivity of British patenting to fees was clearly shown in 1852, 
when the initial fee for a uK patent was reduced from approximately £ 350 
(corresponding to $ 1,680, see Khan (2005, p. 31)) to £ 25 and the number 
of patents leapt from 455 issued in 1851 to 2,187 in 1853; following a further 
reduction to £ 4 in 1883 the annual total of patents almost trebled from 5,993 in 
1883 to 17,100 in 1884. 
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urban centres. these results, in sokoloff’s interpretation, 
suggest that patents and inventive activities were, in 
general, highly responsive to the expansion of markets. 
this influence of “market pulling” factors on patenting, in 
sokoloff and Khan’s view, indicates a general responsiveness 
“of inventive activity... to material incentives, as well 
as to the availability and security of property rights in 
technology” (Khan and sokoloff, 2001, p. 240). 
in a related contribution, Khan and sokoloff (1990) 
examine the issue of the responsiveness of individual 
inventors to the economic inducements granted by the 
patent system over the period 1790-1846. they conclude 
that american inventors sought consistently to secure 
patent rights for their inventions and that patent protection 
permitted a fairly effective appropriation of economic 
returns stemming from inventive activities.
Khan and sokoloff (1998) have compared the British and 
american patent systems. undoubtedly, the British patent 
system before the 1852 reform was far less effective than the 
american in protecting the intellectual property rights of the 
patentee. furthermore, as we have seen, administrative and 
monetary costs were considerably higher in Britain than in 
the united states, and this restrained access to the system. 
By the 1810s, the us surpassed Britain in patenting per 
capita, and it would remain higher in the us throughout the 
nineteenth century (Khan and sokoloff, 2001, pp. 238-239). 
this evidence, according to Khan and sokoloff suggests that 
the rate of innovation was probably lower in early industrial 
Britain than in the united states. obviously, this assessment 
is based on the assumption that patenting per capita reflects 
the relative volume of inventive activity. however, as mokyr 
(2002, p. 295) has aptly remarked, the analysis of sokoloff 
and his associates does not appear consistent with the 
traditional view of economic historians and historians of 
technology, who have regarded the period 1790-1850 as a 
phase of firmly established British technological leadership.13 
13 in this sense, the interpretation of sokoloff and his associates is consistent 
with recent research contending that traditional accounts of industrialization may 
be in need of some revision, with the united states “overtaking” Britain in an 
earlier period. for example, according to the recent estimates of Broadberry and 
irwin (2006), the united states attained a substantial lead in labour productivity in 
industry over Britain as early as 1840. for a thorough discussion of the technology 
gap between Britain and the united states in the first half of the nineteenth 
century from the point of view of the history of technology, arguing in favour of 
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in other contributions, using data on the licensing 
and assigning behaviour of a large number of patentees, 
lamoreaux and sokoloff (1996; 1999a; 1999b; 2001) argue 
that in the united states, during the nineteenth century, a 
solid market for technical innovations structured around 
the institution of the patent system progressively emerged. 
through this well functioning “market for technology”, 
individual inventors were able to sell to firms the new 
technical knowledge they had discovered. in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the growth and consolidation 
of this market was also favoured by the emergence of 
a specialized class of intermediaries (patent agents and 
solicitors) who were able to “match” buyers and sellers in this 
market for patent rights, thereby lowering transaction costs 
substantially (lamoreaux and sokoloff, 2002). the existence 
of this type of market promoted a fruitful division of labour, 
with “technologically creative individuals” (lamoreaux and 
sokoloff, 1999b, p. 3) specializing in inventive activities, and 
firms specializing in the production and commercialisation 
phases.14 hence, the coupled development of the patent 
system and the market for technology determined a steady 
acceleration in the rate of innovation. 
an interesting example of the operation of this market for 
technology is provided in lamoreaux and sokoloff (2000), 
where they consider the case of the american glass industry. 
in this case too, they find evidence of the existence of a 
well-established market for technology operating through 
two channels: first, specialized trade journals disseminating 
general information and providing detailed descriptions of 
patent specifications; secondly, specialized patent agents 
who were able to act as intermediaries in the sale of 
patented technologies. in the same study, lamoreaux and 
sokoloff also notice that a number of locations with high 
a British lead  –  especially in mechanical engineering  –  until about the 1850s, see 
musson (1981). 
14 more specifically, sokoloff, lamoreaux and Khan distinguish two phases 
characterizing the historical evolution of nineteenth-century inventive activities 
in the united states (lamoreaux and sokoloff, 1996, pp. 12686-12687). the 
first phase covers approximately the period, 1790-1846. in this period, inventive 
activities are widespread across the entire population (“democratization of 
invention”). the rather simple nature of technology permitted ordinary citizens 
with common skills to be engaged in inventive activities. the second phase 
covers the period 1840-1920 when, owing to the spread of mechanization and 
the increasing complexity of technology, inventions were primarily produced by 
individuals with technical backgrounds who were strongly committed to inventive 
activities; the market for technology reinforced this process of specialization. 
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patenting activities (in glass) were characterized by little 
glass production. in their view, this finding indicates that 
“learning by doing” and “localized knowledge spillovers” 
(two factors that have been prominently put forward 
to explain the connection between the localization of 
production and innovation) played a relatively minor role in 
the technological development of the industry. Geographical 
clusters of patenting in the american glass industry are 
instead accounted for by the existence of a more developed 
market for technology in those areas. although lamoreaux 
and sokoloff acknowledge that it is hard to draw robust 
generalizations, they contend that, by combining the evidence 
of the glass industry with their findings for the economy as 
a whole, the proposition that the development of the patent 
system produced a tidy and fruitful division of labour 
between innovation and production appears to be confirmed. 
as should be clear from this concise summary of 
their contributions, lamoreaux, sokoloff and Khan have 
elaborated a complex account of technical change in the 
course of us industrialization, which is in many respects 
similar to the one originally proposed for Britain by dutton. 
it is worth stressing again that their interpretation, more 
or less explicitly, down-plays the role of learning by doing 
and of knowledge spillovers in nineteenth-century technical 
advances. 
4. Innovation without Patents
several pieces of evidence suggest that many inventors 
did not resort to patent protection. for the advocates of the 
application of the traditional market-failure for patents to the 
case of the industrial revolution, this is rather puzzling. of 
course, detailed quantitative assessments of the amount of 
inventive activity undertaken outside the coverage of patent 
protection remain inherently speculative. the appeal of 
patents for economists and economic historians largely stems 
from the opportunity to study systematically the full universe 
of patented inventions. By contrast, any catalogue of the 
inventions that remained unpatented is likely to be fraught 
with omissions and related biases, or restricted in long-term 
comparisons. moser’s (2005; 2010) research on the inventions 
presented at the crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 probably 
provides the best quantitative snapshot of the large volume 
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of inventive activity undertaken outside the patent system in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Remarkably, she finds that only 
a very small share (11 per cent for Britain and 14 per cent 
for the usa) of exhibits was actually patented. none of the 
British or american industries she considers had patenting 
rates (i.e., the ratio between patented inventions and total 
inventions) higher than 50 per cent. the highest value she 
reports is 36.4 per cent for the us machinery industry. these 
results are striking, but need to be interpreted with caution. 
as noted by Khan (2014), exhibitions data are by their very 
nature highly idiosyncratic, since they reflect the criteria of 
inclusion that were decided for each specific exhibit or fair. 
this means that the amount of noise caused by the inclusion 
in the sample of items that are not innovations or that are 
not patentable is likely to vary from context to context. 
Khan (2014) examines the case of the exhibitions of the 
massachusetts charitable mechanic association over the 
period 1835-1875: after having “depurated” these data from 
non-innovative items and non-patentable subject matter, she 
finds that 34.7 per cent of the exhibits were protected by 
patents. thomson (2009, pp. 204-208) provides other data 
from the new york crystal Palace Exhibition of 1853: in this 
case the patenting rate is 60.2 per cent. 
Prosopographical studies of inventors are another source 
that can provide useful insights into the volume of inventive 
activities carried out with and without patent protection. this 
approach has been pioneered by Khan and sokoloff (Khan 
and sokoloff, 1993; Khan and sokoloff, 2004; see also Khan, 
2005, ch. 7). Khan and sokoloff construct a “great inventors” 
sample, extracting from a number of american biographical 
dictionaries all the individuals to whom at least one major 
invention was ascribed. Khan and sokoloff’s (1993) sample 
comprises 160 great inventors. for the period 1790-1865 
Khan and sokoloff (1993, p. 290) report that 93.7 per cent 
of their american “great inventors” were also patentees. Khan 
(2015) has constructed a comparable sample of 337 British 
“great inventors” active in the period 1790-1930. in this 
case the share of patentees is 86.9 per cent.15 overall, these 
findings would seem to suggest that, both in Britain and in 
the us, the patent system provided a positive incentive effect 
15 according to Khan, the differences in the patent propensity in the us and 
British sample of “great inventors” is due to the relatively high cost of the British 
system. 
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for the inventive activities of “great inventors”. furthermore, 
if we assume that these inventors were those involved in 
the creation of major technological breakthroughs, one may 
indeed regard these findings as a powerful endorsement for 
the optimistic interpretation of the effectiveness of patent 
systems in incentivizing inventors.
macleod and nuvolari (2006) have recently raised 
concerns over this type of “great inventors” exercise. on 
reflection, it is clear that the use of these iconic works of 
collective biography is unlikely to provide a random or 
representative sample of inventors. consequently, a detailed 
inquiry into the criteria governing the selection of entries 
in such historical reference works should be a compulsory 
research step in this type of exercise. macleod and nuvolari 
(2006) investigate this issue in detail, by considering the 
representation of inventive activities during the British 
industrial revolution in the first edition of the Dictionary of 
National Biography (DNB) (1885-1900). they construct a 
sample of “great” British inventors, following a methodology 
similar to the one adopted by Khan and sokoloff (i.e. they 
select all individuals alive in the period 1650-1850 who are 
credited with at least one invention in their DNB entry). the 
analysis of the inventive activities of the 383 “great” British 
inventors identified by macleod and nuvolari suggests the 
existence in the DNB of a strong bias towards inventors 
active in very specific technological fields, such as steam 
engineering, navigation, railways, etc. (mostly those associated 
with the grand narrative of the British industrial revolution 
and imperial advance). other technologies and industries, 
such as consumption goods, food and drink production, etc., 
that recent historical scholarship has shown to be of great 
economic and technological significance (see Bruland, 2004) 
did not receive adequate attention by the compilers of the 
DNB. interestingly enough, macleod and nuvolari (2006) 
find that more than 39 per cent of their sample of “great” 
British inventors extracted from the Dictionary of National 
Biography never took a patent: a result, again, pointing to a 
considerable volume of inventive activity taking place outside 
the coverage of the patent system during the early phases of 
British industrialization.16
16 the difference between the propensity to patent in the British “great 
inventors” samples of Khan (2015) and of macleod and nuvolari (2006) is indeed 
rather striking. Probably this may be related to the different criteria adopted for 
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another selection of “great inventors” of the British 
industrial revolution of potential interest is that constructed 
by allen (2009a, pp. 269-271), which finds that 32 per 
cent of these inventors did not take patents.17 finally, 
meisenzhal and mokyr (2012) construct a broad sample of 
759 noteworthy inventors and “inventive” engineers and 
workmen of the period of the British industrial revolution. 
here the share of patentees is 60 per cent. 
on reflection, this variety of quantitative appraisals of the 
propensity to patent should not be too surprising, since it is 
simply a reflection of the different nature of the sources and 
the “samples” used, which can only capture the multifarious 
“universe” of innovations in a partial and imperfect 
manner. in general terms, our assessment is that, overall, 
these different studies suggest that a significant amount of 
inventive activities occurred outside the coverage of patent 
protection. 
these aggregate results are supported by “micro-
evidence” emerging from detailed histories of inventors, 
industries and specific technologies. famous examples 
of unpatented inventions include crompton’s spinning 
mule, trevithick’s high-pressure steam engine, and Jenner’s 
vaccination against smallpox. at least two highly innovative 
manufacturers, Josiah Wedgwood and Jesse Ramsden, 
renounced patents subsequent to an early disillusionment 
(macleod, 1988, p. 111; mcconnell, 2007). harrison’s 
chronometer was famously invented in response to the 
longitude act of 1714 and much inventive activity is 
captured in the records of institutions such as the Royal 
society of london, and the society of arts, which from 
1754 offered premiums and prizes for invention (macleod, 
1988, pp. 193-195; hilaire-Pérez, 2000, pp. 189-209; 
Griffiths et al., 1996).18 furthermore, a large volume of 
the construction of the two “great inventors” samples. the obvious conclusion 
is that the findings of these “great inventors” exercises must be cautiously 
interpreted. 
17 this estimate is obtained by matching allen’s list of inventors with 
Woodcroft (1854)
18 interestingly enough, at least in principle, the award system of the society 
of arts, was opposed to patents, as the “Rules and notices of the society” 
stated explicitly that “no person shall receive any premium, or bounty from the 
society, for any matter for which he has obtained or proposes to obtain a patent” 
(harrison, 2006, p. 163). a recent study by Brunt et al. (2012) of the prizes for 
invention awarded by the Royal agricultural society of England over the period 
1839-1939 shows that prizes could be very effective stimuli for inventive activities.
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inventions were of incremental nature, and consequently 
anonymous and detectable only by their effects. although 
often overlooked in assessments of patenting, the 
crucial importance of (usually unpatented) incremental 
improvements is widely acknowledged in both histories of 
industrialization and modern empirical studies of innovation 
(landes, 1969; mathias, 1969).
technological change in major sectors of the economy 
raised productivity or offered consumers a widening 
range of goods, on a scale that was scarcely hinted at in 
the patent records. a striking example of the former was 
the agricultural sector, with only 4 per cent of eighteenth-
century patents. yet, “between 1300 and 1800 the average 
yield of wheat rose from about 12 bushels per acre to about 
20 bushels”; the output per acre of other crops realised 
similar or greater increases (allen, 2008, p. 182). this 66 
per cent increase in yields was achieved principally after 
1600, through the introduction of nitrogen-fixing crops in 
new rotations, which left no trace in the patent records.19 
also of importance in raising (both land and labour) 
productivity were improvements in drainage, manures, 
seeds, and implements (allen, 2008, p. 202). a small range 
of drainage devices and a few implements were patented, 
the latter mostly after 1780 – a development stemming from 
the emergence of specialist manufacturers of agricultural 
implements  –  but their number was scarcely commensurate 
with the improvements in this sphere. similarly, the 
gains made through selective breeding of livestock went 
unpatented. Where not anonymous, they were rewarded 
rarely with patents, more often with prizes from agricultural 
and improvement societies, or sometimes they were 
protected by copyright in agrarian treatises (macleod, 1988, 
pp. 98, 193-195).
the mining industry produced even fewer patents, despite 
its growing in economic importance, its output expanding 
rapidly in volume and value. as mines became deeper and 
seams were worked further and further underground, a 
host of new technical challenges had to be met. yet, the 
extraction of coal and ores scarcely featured in the patent 
19 a major recent study by olmstead and Rhode (2008, see in particular pp. 
400-401) has also stressed the fundamental role of a stream of biological innovation 
in american agricultural development throughout the nineteenth century taking 
place long before the introduction of intellectual property protection (Plant 
Protection act of 1930). 
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records: only three patents were obtained for rock-boring 
tools or blasting techniques during the eighteenth century; 
only three for proposed solutions to the pressing problems 
of ventilation and “fire-damp” (explosions). the productivity 
of the mining industry was raised in large part by the 
incremental adjustments to techniques practised by miners 
and skilled managers. Patentees were attracted instead to 
the solution of strictly mechanical problems in the mining 
industry –  in particular, drainage and winding engines –  that 
were visible on the surface, easily described, and represented 
a significant capital investment. a patent for such engines 
was both more easily policed and more marketable than 
the empirical improvements being devised underground 
(macleod, 1988, pp. 100-102).
finally, the English brewing industry represents another 
example of an industry characterized by rapid technological 
change yet by a relatively low propensity to patent. 
furthermore, in this industry, recent research by nuvolari 
and sumner (2013) has pointed to the critical role of a class 
of “consultant” chemists and engineers who, by means of 
sophisticated strategies of selective revealing, were able to 
successfully trade their inventions even without resorting to 
patent protection. 
5. The Significance of Collective Invention 
following the seminal contribution of Bob allen, recent 
research is increasingly drawing attention to the critical 
importance of collective invention settings as critical 
institutional support for inventive activities during the 
early phases of industrialization (allen 1983). in collective 
invention settings, competing firms freely release to one 
another pertinent technical information on the construction 
details and the performance of the technologies they 
have just introduced.20 allen first noticed this type of 
behaviour in the iron industry of cleveland (uK) over the 
period 1850-1875, where iron producers freely disclosed 
to their competitors technical information concerning 
the construction details and the performance of the blast 
furnaces they had erected. in allen’s words, 
20 for a discussion of knowledge sharing among inventors in different historical 
periods, see Bessen and nuvolari (2016).
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... if a firm constructed a new plant [more specifically, a blast 
furnace] of novel design and that plant proved to have lower 
costs than other plants, these facts were made available to other 
firms in the industry and to potential entrants. the next firm 
constructing a new plant built on the experience of the first by 
introducing and extending the design change that had proved 
profitable. the operating characteristics of the second plant 
would then also be made available to potential investors. in 
this way fruitful lines of technical advance were identified and 
pursued (allen, 1983, p. 2).
information was normally released through both formal 
channels (presentations at meetings of engineering societies 
and publications of design details in technical journals) and 
informal ones (such as visits to plants, conversations, etc.). 
additionally, new technical knowledge was usually not 
protected by patents, so that competing firms could liberally 
make use of the released information when they came to 
erect a new plant. 
as a consequence of the proliferation of these “voluntary” 
knowledge spillovers, in the period considered, the height of 
the furnaces and the blast temperature increased steadily by 
means of a series of small but continuous rises. increases in 
furnace height and in the blast temperature brought about 
lower fuel consumption and thereby lower production costs. 
on the basis of his findings, allen suggests that the pattern 
of technical change emerging from collective invention 
settings is dominated by incremental innovations.
another important case of nineteenth-century collective 
invention has been identified by nuvolari (2004). in this 
case, the technology developed collectively was the steam 
pumping engines which were used for draining cornish 
copper and tin mines. in the wake of their disappointing 
experience with Watt’s patent for the separate condenser, 
when inventive activities were frustrated by Boulton 
and Watt’s tight enforcement of Watt’s “master” patent 
(nuvolari and verspagen, 2007), cornish steam engineers 
typically preferred not to patent their inventions. 
accordingly, the share of cornish patents in steam 
engineering for the period 1813-1852 fell to under one 
per cent of the national total.21 yet, in the same period, 
21 in the period 1698-1812, cornwall’s share in the national total was about 10 
per cent, which was the second highest share, after london, see nuvolari (2004, p. 
358). this shift indicates a significant change in the propensity to patent. 
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cornwall assumed the technological leadership in steam 
engineering, with the introduction and development of 
the high-pressure engines. it is also important to note 
that in 1812 cornish mining engineers and entrepreneurs 
launched a monthly journal called Lean’s Engine Reporter 
with the explicit intention of facilitating the discovery and 
rapid dissemination of best-practice techniques. it can be 
shown that the systematic comparison of technical features, 
operational procedures and performance of the engines 
allowed engineers to identify the best design configuration, 
for example in terms of cylinder size, for attaining 
economies of fuel (nuvolari and verspagen, 2009).
as with the cleveland blast furnaces described by 
allen, the emergence of a collective invention regime 
was favoured by a specific set of conditions. first, the 
“empirical” nature of inventive activities (in this period 
there was no established theory of the functioning of the 
steam engine) made it particularly fruitful to extrapolate 
the best design options from the systematic collection and 
analysis of information concerning variation in the design 
and performance of a large number of engines. secondly, 
the structure of the cornish mining industry (where mine 
entrepreneurs usually held shares in several different mines) 
favoured the search for improvements in the average 
performance of pumping engines (the rapid dissemination 
of best-practice techniques was clearly the most direct way 
for raising average performance). at the same time, the 
systematic publication of the performance of the engines 
allowed the best engineers to demonstrate their engineering 
skills and improve their professional reputations and career 
prospects. 
although not as systematic as the “collective invention” 
identified in cornwall or cleveland, a similar disregard for 
patents is also recognizable among other innovative groups 
in this period, such as london’s clock and instrument 
makers (macleod, 1988, pp. 113-114; mcconnell, 2007), 
the first generation of West Riding textile engineers 
(cookson, 1997, pp. 8-9), civil engineers and early 
developers of machine tools  –  though secrecy was probably 
as rife as sharing (macleod, 1988, pp. 105-106, 188). 
in another recent contribution, allen suggests that the 
organization of inventive activities by means of collective 
invention was also characteristic of other technologies 
developed during the industrial Revolution (allen, 
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2009a). the first case he mentions is the development of 
coal-burning houses in london during the seventeenth 
century. since most of the innovations in this field were 
unpatentable, builders copied and adapted innovations 
from each other (allen, 2009a, pp. 92-93). the second 
case he describes is the adoption of clover, sainfoin and 
turnips in crop rotations by open-field farmers (allen, 2009, 
pp. 68-74). furthermore, even inventions that originally 
were developed by individual inventors such as James 
hargreaves’ spinning jenny were improved and refined by 
means of collective invention processes. for example, the 
original spinning jenny had 12 spindles, but very soon a 
24-spindles model was developed for use in cottages, and 
models of 80 up to 120 spindles for use in workshops. 
according to allen (2009b, p. 906): “[t]hese improvements 
in the jenny were accomplished without patents and were 
effected by collective invention”.
Were these examples of knowledge sharing activities a 
response to the very imperfect English patent system of 
the time? as we have seen, to obtain an English patent, an 
inventor had to pay expensive fees and endure unwieldy 
administrative procedures. Perhaps if the English patent 
system had been more like its american counterpart  –  with 
low fees and simple procedures  –  more English inventors 
would have chosen to appropriate returns using patents. 
this might have led to less knowledge sharing, but perhaps 
higher levels of private investment in the search for 
innovations. this interpretation would be consistent with 
the assessment of the us patent system put forward by 
Khan and sokoloff (1998). 
yet, it would be wrong to assume that collective invention 
was just a British phenomenon. for example, in his account 
of the development of the high-pressure engine for the 
western steamboats in the united states during the early 
nineteenth century, hunter emphasized the significance of 
various flows of incremental innovations (hunter, 1949, pp. 
121-180). in the light of the present discussion this passage 
is particularly intriguing: 
though the men who developed the machinery of the 
western steamboat possessed much ingenuity and inventive 
skill, the record shows that they had little awareness of or 
use for the patent system. of more than six hundreds patents 
relating to steam engines issued in this country down to 1847 
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only some forty were taken out in the names of men living 
in towns and cities of the western rivers. few even of this 
small number had any practical significance. in view of the 
marked western preference for steam over water power and 
the extensive development of steam-engine manufacturing 
in the West, these are surprising figures. how is this meager 
showing to be explained and interpreted? does it reflect a 
distaste for patents as a species of monopoly uncongenial to 
the democratic ways of the West, an attitude sharpened by 
the attempts of fulton and Evans to collect royalties from 
steamboatman? or, were western mechanics so accustomed 
to think in terms of mere utility that they failed to grasp the 
exploitative possibilities of the products of their ingenuity? 
or, did mechanical innovation in this field proceed by such 
small increments as to present few points which could readily 
be seized upon by a potential patentee? Perhaps each of 
these suggestions  –  and especially the last  –  holds a measure 
of the truth. at all events the fact remains that, so far as can 
be determined, no significant part of the engine, propelling 
mechanism, or boilers during the period of the steamboat’s 
development to maturity was claimed and patented as a 
distinctive and original development (hunter, 1949, pp. 175-
176). 
interestingly, hunter suggests that the litigation of the 
patents taken by Robert fulton and oliver Evans may 
account for the negative attitude of western mechanics 
towards patents (hunter, 1949, pp. 10, 124-126). at the 
same time, hunter is able to document the emergence 
among western steamboatmen and mechanics of a number 
of rules of thumb in steam boat design and operating 
practices that were continuously refined and improved by 
means of information exchanges (hunter, 1949, pp. 176-
180). this steady accumulation of many minor changes 
and alterations to the design of the steamers produced 
improvements in carrying capacity, increases of speed, 
reduction of cargo collection times, etc., leading to a rate 
of productivity growth without parallel in the transport 
technology of the period (mak and Walton, 1972).
Knowledge sharing practices have also been described 
in other classic historical studies of nineteenth-century 
american industries. Judith mcGaw’s (1987) study of 
paper-making in Berkshire, massachusetts, during the 
nineteenth century documents that paper manufacturers 
engaged in extensive information exchanges concerning 
machinery to purchase and their possible adaptation 
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to specific production tasks. in her interpretation, this 
knowledge sharing was key to the industrial success of the 
region. similarly, anthony f.B. Wallace found evidence of 
continuous free exchanges of information on the solution 
of technical problems among fellow mechanics and machine 
makers (Wallace, 1978, pp. 211-239).22 
as a final consideration, it is important not to dismiss 
these cases of collective invention as “curious exceptions”. 
it is worth stressing, once more, that key-technologies that 
lay at the heart of the industrialization process, such as 
high-pressure steam engines, steamboats, iron production 
technique, etc. were at times developed in a collective 
invention fashion, and consequently outside the coverage 
of the patent system. according to Bessen and nuvolari 
(2014) systematic knowledge sharing is likely to emerge in 
industries in which the diffusion of a new technology is 
delayed by skills or capacity constraints so that old and new 
technologies coexist for a period.23 interestingly enough, 
this was plausibly a relatively common scenario for many 
industries during the industrial revolution where in many 
sectors the expansion of production was constrained by 
shortages of skilled mechanics and engineers. 
6. Other Institutional Arrangements 
Supporting Inventive Activities
david (1993) has suggested that, in capitalist economies, 
the institutional arrangements supporting inventive activities 
may be summarized in terms of three P’s, namely Property 
Rights (or patents), Patronage and Procurement. in this 
respect, so far, historical research has focused primarily 
on the patent system. We believe that is important that 
historians in their future research efforts devote attention 
also to the other two P’s. here we will limit ourselves to 
some considerations which suggest that these alternative 
institutional arrangements to patent protection may have 
played an important role in supporting inventive activities 
22 in the us case, knowledge sharing activities taking place in networks 
of mechanics and machine makers are also described by thomson (2009). a 
particular interesting case described by thomson is the knowledge sharing 
activities instigated by the us government in the production of firearms during the 
1820s and 1830s (thomson, 2009, pp. 54-59). 
23 see also Boldrin and levine (2008, ch. 6). 
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in specific technological fields in the early phases of 
industrialization. 
let us consider first the case of public procurement. the 
famous block-making machinery (a complex of machines 
which permitted the full mechanization of the production 
of pulley-blocks for the Royal navy ships) was developed 
by marc Brunel and henry maudslay at the Portsmouth 
dockyards, following a contract of public procurement 
with the admiralty (Rolt, 1957, pp. 32-33 and coad, 2005). 
another famous case of successful public support for the 
development of a specific invention is the “congreve” 
rocket which was developed at the Royal arsenal in 
Woolwich by William congreve (stearn, 2004). 
in some cases, procurement for certain technological 
advances was implemented by means of prizes and 
competitions.24 Perhaps one of the most successful cases of 
this form of public procurement is the longitude act of 
1714. the act established a handsome prize of £ 20,000 for 
a method for determining the longitude at sea (which was 
one of the most taxing problems of oceanic navigation). 
the prize was finally assigned in 1775 to John harrison for 
his “perfect clock” after a prolonged struggle. Be this as it 
may, harrison’s clock is nowadays recognized as one of the 
most fundamental breakthroughs in marine instrumentation 
(King, 2004). 
Paul david’s contributions (see, e.g., david, 2004) 
have made clear that public patronage became, from the 
sixteenth century onwards, the most important form of 
support of “scientific” research. however, it should be 
recognized that during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century, some forms of public patronage also covered 
technological activities. for example, we can surely consider 
in this light the public support provided by the treasury 
to charles Babbage’s pioneering efforts to construct a 
mechanical calculating engine, although evidently the project 
cannot be regarded as fully crowned with success (swade, 
2004).25 
24 according to Boehm and silberston (1967, pp. 25-26) from 1750 to 1825 
there were at least eight acts of Parliament instituting various forms of rewards for 
specific type of inventions (most of them in the field of navigation instruments). 
25 another example of a risky (and ultimately unsuccessful) technological 
project that received financial backing (a grant of £ 200) from the admiralty is the 
“gaz engine” of marc and i.K. Brunel, see Buchanan (2002, pp. 20-22). 
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another important case of effective patronage of invention 
has been identified by Griffiths, et al. (1992) and hilaire-
Perez (2000, pp. 190-209) in the [Royal] society of arts. 
in the second half of the eighteenth century the society 
promoted inventive activities in a wide range of industries 
by means of prizes. it should be noted that, in the interest 
of dissemination, the society would have not normally 
have assigned a prize to an invention which was patented. 
Griffiths et al. (1992) find that a large volume of inventive 
activities in the textile industries can be linked directly with 
the prize competitions of the society.26 neither should we 
forget that, in some special cases, Parliament also established 
rewards for inventors “post-facto”.27 it was calculated that 
by 1815 more than £ 77,000 had been distributed in this 
form (Boehm and silberston, 1967, p. 26). 
7. Directions for Further Research
as this survey of recent contributions has shown, 
considerable progress has been made in the analysis of the 
role played by patent systems during the early phases of 
industrialization. however, it is also clear that important 
issues are still in need of further investigation. in this 
section, we would like to flag up what seem to us to be the 
most fruitful directions for further research. 
a) it is vital to connect research on the emergence 
of patent systems with recent research on the nature of 
inventive activities in pre-industrial revolution Western 
societies (1500-1750). in this respect, Epstein (1998) has 
taken a revisionist stance and argued that, contrary to the 
traditional view, some features of the guild system may have 
represented an effective organizational arrangement for 
encouraging both invention and its diffusion in a context 
where technological knowledge was chiefly tacit and 
empirical and costs of transmission were high (see, however, 
ogilvie (2005) for some cautionary notes on this argument). 
similarly, Belfanti (2004) argues that early patents and guilds 
26 in france, direct public patronage and procurement of invention was much 
stronger than in Britain (hilaire-Perez, 2002). 
27 Recipients of this type of reward comprise: samuel crompton, inventor of 
the spinning mule and Edward Jenner, inventor of the smallpox vaccine, Edmund 
cartwright, inventor of the power-loom, and henry and sealy fourdrinier, 
importers of the paper-making machine.
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were two instruments of technology policy which were 
used consciously in tandem by mercantilist states during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. these perspectives 
open the possibility of shedding new light on the processes 
of transformation/adaptation undergone by patents 
(changing their nature from an instrument for stimulating 
technology transfer to a device for incentivizing domestic 
innovation) during the early phases of industrialization 
(david, 1993). in this respect, the recent contributions of 
Epstein and Belfanti suggest that this transition was an 
element of a broader process of historical change which 
involved other forms of intellectual property rights and 
a concomitant re-definition of the notions of authorship, 
invention and creativity.28
b) increasing attention should be paid to the role 
of invention conducted outside the coverage of patent 
protection. this involves making further progress with the 
collective-invention research agenda (search for other cases 
of collective invention and systematic analysis of the various 
sets of conditions which led to the emergence and/or 
disappearance of collective invention in different historical 
circumstances). We also need, however, to go beyond that. 
as noted by nelson (1992), in every industry there is always 
a component of technological change which is publicly 
shared. from this perspective, collective invention processes 
can be seen as representing one extreme of a much wider 
spectrum. hence it is important to study and compare in 
detail the patterns of patented and unpatented inventive 
activities in a variety of industrial contexts. 
c) the case of the English brewing industry studied by 
nuvolari and sumner (2013) indicates that “markets for 
technologies” can function also without using patents. it 
would be important to establish whether this pattern was a 
specific peculiarity of this industry or whether it was instead 
representative of a more widespread phenomenon. 
d) it is also important to combine the use of patents 
as indicators of inventive activities with indicators 
constructed on the basis of other historical sources. the 
contributions of Petra moser (2005; 2010) have shown the 
potentialities of the ingenious use of exhibition data. for 
many industries, there is a rich contemporary engineering 
28 see Biagioli (2006) for a challenging account of the changing use of patents 
for protecting invention in scientific instruments in the early-modern period. 
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literature which could be used for constructing lists of 
inventions (covering both patented and non-patented 
ones) and also for an assessment of their technological and 
economic significance. 
8. Concluding Remarks
our survey of historical research suggests that accounts 
of industrialization that are based on simple and general 
causal mechanisms linking the emergence of patent 
systems and markets for technology with an acceleration of 
inventive activities may be unwarranted. following mokyr 
(2002), it might be assumed that the origins of western 
industrialization lay in a revolution in the procedures for 
the accumulation and dissemination of “useful knowledge” 
taking place in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
the precise role that patent systems played in this transition 
is particularly hard to unravel given the complex set of 
positive and negative links characterizing the connection 
between patents and the rate of invention (this is also the 
conclusion reached by mokyr, 2002, p. 295). however, 
the evidence discussed in this paper, shows that, in this 
historical phase, patents constituted only one component 
of a much broader and articulated system of institutional 
arrangements supporting inventive activities (see also 
macleod and nuvolari, 2012). furthermore, widespread 
inventive activity was taking place outside the coverage of 
patent protection. for these reasons, it seems likely that, 
with no patent system at all, the industrial revolution would 
not have happened exactly as it did, but the wider and 
deeper pressures towards industrialization throughout the 
western hemisphere at this period imply that it would have 
occurred in some form, more or less at the same time, and 
most probably in Britain (allen, 2009a). 
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